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Introduction
Bill Skate became the fifth prime minister of 
Papua New Guinea after the 1997 national elec-
tions. A two-term parliamentarian by then, much 
had already been written about his less-fortunate 
upbringing in the slums of Port Moresby as well as 
his reputation as an astute political strategist noto-
rious for his single-mindedness. Skate’s elevation to 
the top post in the country perhaps barely raised 
eyebrows among those who knew how the game 
was played in Waigani, but it certainly dismayed 
many ordinary observers. It was widely believed 
that a number of members of parliament (MPs) 
were bought off to form the Skate government.
His term in office, from mid-1997 to mid-1999, 
was marred by political instability and poor govern-
ance on such a scale that a sense of urgency emerged 
to avert a further slide into despair; ‘something’ had 
to be done (see Standish 2001:295). That was the 
intention of prime minister Sir Mekere Morauta, 
Skate’s successor, when he announced his platform as 
a ‘date with destiny’. Morauta’s program was designed 
to stabilise politics and the economy (Gelu 2006:60).
One of the elements of this program was the 
introduction of the Organic Law on the Integrity of 
Political Parties and Candidates (OLIPPAC), aimed 
at stabilising politics in the national parliament 
by addressing the weaknesses of political parties. 
The OLIPPAC was first introduced to parliament 
for debate in 2000 and was enacted in 2001. But 
in July 2010 a five-member bench of Papua New 
Guinea’s Supreme Court ruled that there were 
inconsistencies between the country’s Constitution 
and sections of the OLIPPAC. Questions have 
now been raised about future directions of 
parliamentary politics in Papua New Guinea. The 
OLIPPAC has generated considerable debate (e.g. 
see Fraenkel 2004; Reilly 2006). Some claimed that 
it had failed (Gelu 2005); others claimed some 
success (e.g. see Sepoe 2005). Some pointed out 
that in a Westminster parliamentary democracy 
such laws may prevent the removal of unpopular 
governments (e.g. see Fraenkel et al. 2008).1 
Generally, the implementation of the OLIPPAC 
since 2001 has been poor. Parliamentarians have 
behaved as they did before the OLIPPAC was 
adopted (Sepoe 2005; May 2008). Government 
agencies, in particular the Ombudsman 
Commission, appeared to lack commitment to 
apply the OLIPPAC against those who infringed it.
The OLIPPAC was ambitious, given the deep 
fragmentation of the country — a population of 
approximately 6.2 million people speaking more 
than 800 languages. The island of New Guinea, 
divided between Papua New Guinea to the east and 
Indonesia to the west, is among the most rugged in 
the world. Papua New Guinea is divided into four 
regions: the Highlands (interior of New Guinea), 
Papua (southern coast), Momase (northern New 
Guinea coast) and the New Guinea Islands. These 
regions are subdivided into 20 provinces, includ-
ing the capital, Port Moresby (the National Capital 
District). The country’s parliament comprises 109 
seats — 20 provincial seats and 89 elected members 
from constituencies spread across the country.2 A 
Westminster system of government with a unicam-
eral house was retained after independence from 
Australia in 1975.
Since the 1980s ‘yo-yo’ politics, characterised 
by MPs jumping from party to party, has become 
the norm. The use, or threatened use, of a vote 
of no confidence against a government, after an 
18-months grace period, was a feature of most 
parliamentary sittings. Consequently, govern-
ment business was continually dominated by 
political games of survival. Prime ministers and 
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cabinets struggled to procure support to stay in 
office, while those outside did everything possible 
to dislodge the government. So great was the 
perpetual struggle that normal parliamentary 
debate of legislation received scant attention. 
The government changed three times through 
successful votes of no confidence, and seven 
times after national elections. Threats of a vote of 
no confidence were just as effective as an actual 
motion on the floor of parliament because a prime 
minister would do whatever he could, including 
reshape his coalition government and reallocate 
ministries, in order to remain in power.
Political and development challenges came to a 
head in the 1990s. The election of Mekere Morauta 
in mid-1999 as the country’s sixth prime minister 
was widely welcomed. A former senior public 
servant, Morauta initiated reforms that included 
the introduction of the OLIPPAC, and replacement 
of the first-past-the-post electoral system with a 
limited preferential voting system. He also ensured 
the independence of the central bank and initiated 
the privatisation of some state-owned enterprises, 
a highly sensitive issue that had been mooted since 
the 1980s (see Turner and Kavanamur 2009:15).
Essence of the OLIPPAC
The text of the OLIPPAC was amended in 2003. 
It has three general sections which are aimed at 
institutional strengthening (see Baker 2005; Sepoe 
et al. 2008). First, an attempt was made to regulate 
the existence and activities of political parties and  
oversee the relationship between parties and MPs.  
Political parties were to be registered with the  
Office of the Registrar of Political Parties (subse-
quently renamed the Integrity of Political Parties 
and Candidates Commission), which was created 
under the OLIPPAC. Each party was required 
to have registered members and elected officials 
to perform specified duties. Provisions in the 
OLIPPAC enabled parties to amalgamate and MPs 
who were elected as independents to join parties.
Secondly, the OLIPPAC attempted to regulate 
MPs’ relationships with political parties. Constant 
changes in MPs’ party affiliations had been a prob-
lem affecting the cohesion of parties and continuity 
of governments. From independence in 1975 until 
the 2002–2007 parliament, no prime minister had 
served out a full five-year term. Perhaps the most 
important provision in the law was that which 
stipulated that an MP’s vote on the choice of a prime 
minister after an election was legally binding for the 
duration of that parliamentary term. MPs endorsed 
by political parties were obliged to vote for the 
prime ministerial candidate chosen by their party. 
Independent MPs were required to maintain their 
support to the candidate for whom they voted unless 
they had joined a party, in which case the party’s 
choice now took precedence over the individual’s 
choice. The legal commitment to a prime minister in 
a vote of no confidence extended to other important 
issues, including supporting the prime minister in a 
vote on the budget or a constitutional amendment.
Thirdly, there were provisions in the OLIPPAC 
to regulate funding of political parties. Annual 
budgetary allocations were to be made by the 
government as well as contributions from the 
public, both citizens and non-citizens. Incentives 
were also included to encourage parties to sponsor 
female candidates, provided they received at least 
10 per cent of the total ballots cast.
Supreme Court Ruling
On 7 July 2010 Papua New Guinea’s Supreme Court 
handed down its decision (NCR No. 11 2008) on an 
application from the Fly River (Western Province) 
Provincial Government. Broadly, there are three 
main bases upon which the court ruled that aspects 
of the OLIPPAC were invalid: (1) some of the 
amendments made to the national Constitution 
in order to authorise the OLIPPAC were ruled 
to be inconsistent with key prior provisions of 
the Constitution; (2) some of the sections of the 
OLIPPAC were deemed unconstitutional because 
they went further than the Constitution permitted; 
and (3) parts of the OLIPPAC were ruled uncons-
titutional as being unreasonable restrictions on 
rights and freedoms specified in Sections 37–39 
of the Constitution as basic to a democratic 
society (A. Regan, pers. comm., 4 May 2011).3 The 
Supreme Court effectively rendered null and void a 
number of sections of the OLIPPAC, namely:
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• Sections 57–59, which deal with a situation 
where an MP resigns from a registered political 
party. These sections point to the need to 
establish the ground(s) for the resignation, 
and whether or not this resignation is to be 
viewed as misconduct in public office. A 
resignation would be subject to scrutiny by the 
Ombudsman Commission (Section 60), which 
oversees the application of the Organic Law on 
the Duties and Responsibilities of Leadership 
(i.e. the Leadership Code). A guilty finding 
could lead to dismissal from office.
• Section 61, which says that an MP should 
remain a member of his/her party while he/she 
is being investigated.
• Section 65, the most controversial of all, 
which says that an MP who was endorsed by a 
registered political party cannot withdraw from 
that party, except on permissible grounds agreed 
to by the registrar of political parties, including 
that the party has broken its constitution, and 
the MP should not join another registered 
political party. As noted above, an MP must 
always comply with party resolutions and 
positions and critically in four areas: (i) a 
motion of no-confidence brought against the 
prime minister or a minister; (ii) a vote for the 
election of a prime minister; (iii) a vote for the 
approval of the national budget; and (iv) a vote 
to enact, amend or repeal a constitutional law 
proposed by the prime minister.
• Section 66, which says that the vote of an MP 
who votes against his party’s resolution shall not 
be counted. MPs who act contrary to Section 
65 shall be referred to the registrar of political 
parties and ultimately to the Ombudsman 
Commission.
• Section 70, under which an independent MP 
must vote in a no-confidence motion according 
to the requirements of Section 65 (an MP 
who voted for a prime minister at the start 
of a parliamentary term is committed to vote 
for that prime minister if there is a vote of 
no-confidence during that term).
• Sections 71–73, under which an independent 
MP who initially voted for the prime minister 
is obligated to support that prime minister 
in a vote on the national budget or a vote to 
enact, amend or repeal a constitutional law (an 
independent who did not vote for the prime 
minister may vote for or against the budget or 
any amendments to a constitutional law).
• Section 81, which permits non-citizens to 
make contributions of up to PGK500,000 to 
political parties; the Supreme Court ruled that 
this provision contravenes Sections 129–130 of 
the Constitution, which, among other things, 
prohibits ‘non-citizens from membership of, and 
from contributing to the funds of, any party or 
organization …’ (the underlying fear being that 
foreign involvement in and/or contributions to 
national parties and organisations might unduly 
influence decisions in favour of the donors).
In addition, the Supreme Court ruled that the 
restrictions placed by the OLIPPAC upon individual 
MPs as citizens of the country ran contrary to the 
following sections in the Constitution:
• Section 12, which defines and outlines the spe-
cificities of an Organic Law, which shall not be 
‘inconsistent with this Constitution …’
• Section 111, which spells out the right of an MP 
to introduce Bills on the floor of parliament
• Section 127, which among other things seeks 
to protect the integrity of candidates and politi-
cal parties from undue influence from outside 
(specifically foreigners) or sources of influence 
that could coerce decisions or outcomes in a pre-
determined manner by those acting from outside 
the political setting
• Section 130, which specifies regulatory measures 
in the conduct of political parties.
At the core of the Supreme Court ruling 
is a fundamental right under Section 50 of the 
Constitution that the OLIPPAC was deemed to 
have violated. Subtitled Special Rights of Citizens, it 
reads in part, ‘to take part in the conduct of public 
affairs, either directly or through freely chosen 
representatives; and to vote for, and to be elected 
to, elective public office as genuine, periodic, free 
elections; and to hold public office and to exercise 
public functions’. The section concludes by saying: 
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‘[T]he exercise of those rights may be regulated 
by a law that is reasonably justifiable for the pur-
pose in a democratic society that has a proper 
regard for the rights and dignity of mankind’. The 
challenge to the OLIPPAC argued that its aim to 
regulate party behaviour and entice orderliness in 
parliament had contravened a fundamental right 
that is enshrined in the Constitution.
Developments Under the OLIPPAC: 2001–2010
Evidence to date suggests that the impact of the 
OLIPPAC was mixed. Some of the outcomes from 
the organic law were contrary to those anticipated. 
Two developments are notable. First, there was 
an element of predictability with regard to which 
party was given the first opportunity to form a 
coalition government after the 2002 and 2007 
national elections. The effect of Section 63(1) of 
the OLIPPAC was that the National Alliance, with 
the largest number of endorsed candidates elected 
in both the 2002 and 2007 national elections, was 
invited by the Governor-General to form the gov-
ernment. This was in contrast to government for-
mation in the past, where coalition governments 
were formed according to which parties were most 
successful in wheeling and dealing. Consider Table 
1 which shows that in 1997 the People’s Progress 
Party won 16 seats and the Pangu Pati 15; Bill 
Skate’s People’s National Congress party was the 
fifth most successful party with six seats but that 
did not prevent Skate from becoming Papua New 
Guinea’s fifth prime minister.
The principal factors deciding the composition 
of governments by 1997 were the use of threats, 
bribery, and activities such as locking up newly 
elected MPs in hotels and houses under armed 
guards. The Papua New Guinea and Australian 
public saw on television what was believed to 
have happened behind closed doors when a 
surveillance tape surfaced showing Skate and a 
cabinet colleague discussing pay-offs soon after the 
formation of his government (Standish 1999:13). 
The National Alliance and Michael Somare had 
meetings with potential coalition parties after the 
2002 and 2007 elections. These were not the typical 
post-election meetings seen before the OLIPPAC 
was introduced. Somare as the party leader of the 
National Alliance was at centre stage. He had no 
rivals outside his own party (in 2002 some members 
of the National Alliance were urging Somare to step 
aside and allow a new party leader to take the reins 
[Chin 2003:460]).
However, Section 63(1) of the OLIPPAC, which 
refers to the invitation of the party with the most 
elected endorsed candidates to form a govern-
ment, has been questioned. The argument is that 
the leader of the biggest party (i.e. the likely prime 
minister) may not necessarily be the best person for 
the post of prime minister. The pre-independence 
(1972) election of Michael Somare as chief minister 
was a case in which a party (Pangu Pati) with fewer 
seats in parliament than the conservative United 
Party offered a leader capable to lead the country. It 
is hard to imagine, however, that the feat of Somare 
in the early 1970s could be repeated today when 
money politics has become entrenched.
Table 1: 1997 National Elections
Political Party/Independent Seats won
Independent 36
People’s Progress Party 16
Pangu Pati 15
National Alliance 8
People’s Democratic Movement 8
People’s National Congress 6
People’s Action Party 5
Melanesian Alliance Party 4
United Party 3
People’s Resources Awareness Party 2
People’s Unity Party 2
Christian Unity Party 1
Movement for Greater Autonomy 1
People’s Solidarity Party 1
PNG National Party 1
Total 109
Source: Kaiulo (1997:14)
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Secondly, the Somare government that formed 
in 2002 became the first in Papua New Guinea’s 
post-independence history to serve a full five-
year parliamentary term,4 even though support for 
Somare was not uncontested in those years. Seri-
ous instability was evidenced, demonstrating that 
the OLIPPAC was disregarded for one reason or 
another. During much of 2003 Somare tried in vain 
to extend the grace period from 18 to 36 months. 
This was ironic given that he was supposed to have 
had the full backing of the OLIPPAC and hence his 
leadership was not under challenge for the entire 
parliamentary term. Some of Somare’s key allies in 
the government were bitterly opposed to the exten-
sion of the grace period, an act that required an 
amendment to the national Constitution, and were 
simultaneously engaged in dialogue with members 
of the Opposition to topple the Prime Minister in a 
vote of no confidence. After failing to sell the idea of 
a ‘grand coalition’ (an inclusive union of all parlia-
mentary parties) to both sides of the House, Somare 
moved swiftly and decisively by sacking a coali-
tion party and several ministers for disloyalty. What 
ensued were confusing movements of parties and 
individual MPs between the government and Oppo-
sition, and some ministers who were initially sacked 
were reinstated (Chin 2005:191–92). Subsequently, 
Somare resorted to Papua New Guinea’s time-tested 
survival tactics, such as the adjournment of parlia-
mentary sittings and cabinet reshuffles, to remain a 
step ahead of his opponents (see Baker 2005; Gelu 
2005). It was strongly rumoured that cash and kind 
were used from time to time to induce support for 
the government. In all, the ruthless tactics of surviv-
al that governments used before the OLIPPAC were 
still being invoked when necessary.
Continuity or Change? Political Parties and 
Independents Under the OLIPPAC
Sepoe (2005:4) and Reilly (2006) have pointed out 
that there were early encouraging signs from the 
implementation of the OLIPPAC. One set of data 
used to suggest a positive development was what 
appeared to be a reduction in the number of politi-
cal parties during the 2002–2007 parliamentary 
term. In relation to both the OLIPPAC and the 
limited preferential voting system, Reilly (2008:16) 
went further to say that ‘political stability has 
increased significantly following the introduction 
of the new laws’. It is difficult to ascertain whether 
any element of political stability between 2002 and 
2007 was the result of the two laws. In fact, results 
from the 2007 national elections do not give a clear 
demonstration that the OLIPPAC and the limited 
preferential voting system have made any signifi-
cant difference (for a general observation of the 
2007 national elections, see May 2008). The number 
of parties and independents, as discussed below, 
showed continuity with the past.
More generally, it is difficult to substantiate 
claims that political stability and the achievement 
of a first five-year term government resulted 
from the OLIPPAC. Other factors were in play. 
The use of money to purchase political support, 
for instance, could have ensured continuity of a 
government for five years. Moreover, what exactly 
was the essence of stability? According to Ladley 
and Williams (2007:15), ‘to take the flagship 
argument of political stability, … it needs an heroic 
extension of the meaning of “stability” to really 
argue that the 2002–2007 government was stable 
— surviving a term is not contested, but suggesting 
that the government was “stable” requires other 
measurements’. Between 2002 and 2007, there 
were five deputy prime ministers, several cabinet 
reshuffles, ministers sacked and parties divided — 
hardly a sign of political stability (Standish 2010).
Political Parties
It was expected that, over time, the OLIPPAC would 
reduce the number of political parties. This has 
not happened. In analysing trends, it is important 
that two factors are kept in mind. First, it may well 
be too soon to expect tangible results from a law 
that is expected to change the behaviour of elected 
representatives. Nonetheless, some degree of success 
has been claimed. Reilly (2006:191) says that the 
reduction of political parties ‘from 42 in 2001 to 
15 in 2004’ demonstrates the intended impact of 
the OLIPPAC. Secondly, a distinction has to be 
made between the number of registered parties 
and the number of parties that win seats at the 
polls. In 2002, 43 political parties were registered 
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and contested the national elections; 21 of these 
registered parties won at least one seat in the 
109-member parliament (Sepoe 2005:4). Reilly 
confuses the number of parties outside parliament 
(43) with parties in parliament (22 later reduced 
to 15). Section 52 of the OLIPPAC allows for the 
amalgamation of political parties, which can reduce 
the number of parties; Section 42 also permits the 
registrar of political parties to deregister political 
parties on certain specified grounds, which 
happened in 2005–2006. It is not convincing to 
say that the reduction in the number of political 
parties was due exclusively to the implementation 
of the OLIPPAC. Initially some major parties rose 
to prominence after the 1968 national elections, 
either in support of immediate independence for 
Papua New Guinea or to delay the process so as 
to allow ‘adequate development’ in the interior 
parts of mainland New Guinea. The number of 
parties remained steady until there was a spurt 
in the growth of parties by the late 1980s (see 
Okole forthcoming). Some of the smaller parties 
originally contested national elections while others 
rose from the floor of parliament (Saffu 1996). 
Tactically, a smaller party was easier to manoeuvre 
to join different parliamentary factions. With 
smaller parties switching between bigger parties 
and parliamentary factions, in the manner of loose 
independent MPs, it was difficult to identify their 
raison d’être and what they stood for, other than 
strategic positioning to capitalise on the perpetual 
struggle for parliamentary numbers to control 
government (see Okole 2005:198–99).
There is no reason to believe that the trend 
of an increasing number of parties will be 
reversed under the OLIPPAC. In fact, there was a 
proliferation of small parties in the lead up to the 
2002 national elections. The cycle repeated itself 
when 34 political parties registered to contest the 
2007 national elections. At the end of counting, 21 
parties had won parliamentary seats, six of them 
as single-member parties and another three parties 
with two members each (May 2008:4–5) (see Table 
3). The much desired amalgamation of parties into 
a few strong parties has not materialised. As of 
November 2010 only two parties have disappeared 
from parliament, bringing the total number down 
from 21 to 19, including six one-member and 
three two-member parties (configuration is slightly 
different from the figures obtained directly after the 
2007 national elections — see Table 2). It is worth 
noting also that the desire to amalgamate has little 
to do with the need to comply with the OLIPPAC. 
The creation and disappearance of political parties 
on the floor of parliament in the 1980s and 1990s, as 
discussed above, is no different from today because 
the existence of parties is guided by other factors. 
They can be motivated by money, values they stand 
by, a desire to be independent from big parties, the 
fear of association with maligned parties and MPs, 
or other reasons. Why would the six one-member 
parties in Table 2 choose to remain as they are?
Another aspect of amalgamation is what can be 
seen in the growth in membership of the National 
Alliance, the main party in the 2007–2011 coalition 
government, which had 39 MPs towards the end of 
2010, 28 members more than the United Resources 
Party. It is unclear that this growth in membership 
was the sole responsibility of the OLIPPAC, even 
though ‘MPs flocked to [Somare’s] bandwagon in 
order to gain patronage for their electorates and 
themselves’ (Standish 2010). What is known as 
‘money politics,’ or the use of money to induce 
favourable outcomes, perhaps exerts the most deci-
sive impact in Papua New Guinea, especially before 
general elections.
Independents
A related assumption was that the OLIPPAC 
offered incentives that would reduce the number 
of independent candidates and independent 
MPs. Again, it is difficult to deduce any credible 
evidence that the OLIPPAC has made a difference 
in discouraging independent candidates over the 
past nine years. Apart from candidates who run 
under party labels solely for financial reasons, 
there is little incentive for individuals to value 
party membership at the electorate level. People’s 
ballot choices still depend on factors other than 
parties, such as candidates’ personality, local 
identification or ethnicity, Melanesian ‘big-man’ 
status, or even promises of projects and outright 
payments for votes. These factors were still decisive 
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in the by-elections that took place after the 2002 
national election, that were held under the newly 
introduced limited preferential voting system 
(e.g. see Standish 2006). Having specific agendas 
to elicit goods and services for their respective 
electorates, some independent candidates take 
pride in their pragmatic lack of party affiliation.
While offering a caveat in relation to reading 
too much into the available data on independent 
candidacies, Reilly (2006:191) correctly points out 
that ‘there has been a sharp decline in the number 
of independent candidates elected to parliament, 
from 36 in at the first sitting of the 1997 parliament 
to 17 in 2002’ (see Table 3). There were 21 success-
ful independent candidates in the 2007 national 
elections (May 2008:4). Table 3 displays the data on 
independent candidates, MPs and political parties 
over the five national elections since 1987.
There was indeed a drop in the number of inde-
pendent candidates in 2002, a difference of 425 from 
Table 2: Political Parties and Independent MPs in Parliament, November 2010
Political Party and Independents No. of Seats  
13 August 2007
No. of Seats 
10 November 2010
1 National Alliance 27 39
2 United Resources Party 5 11
3 People’s Action Party 6 6
4 Peoples National Congress 4 6
5 Peoples Democratic Movement 5 5
6 Papua New Guinea Party 8 5
7 Peoples Progress Party 4 5
8 Papua Niugini Union Pati (PANGU) 5 4
9 People’s Party 3 4
10 New Generation Party 4 3
11 Rural Development Party 3 2
12 PNG Country Party 2 2
13 Melanesian Liberal Party 2 2
14 United Party 2 1
15 Melanesian Alliance Party 1 1
16 PNG National Party 1 1
17 Peoples First Party 1 1
18 Peoples Labour Party 1 1
19 PNG Labour Party 2 1
20 National Advance Party 1
21 PNG Conservative Party 1
Independents 21 9
Sources: 2007: May (2008:4); 2010: Office of the Registrar of Political Parties and Candidates  
(10 November 2010)
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the 1997 figure (row 2). This figure rose slightly to 
1,284 in 2007. In percentage terms, this is signifi-
cant because independent candidacy accounted for 
70 per cent of the total number of candidates in 
1997 after percentages of 63.4 and 74.1 respectively 
for 1987 and 1992. The 2007 percentage (46.5) is 
comparable to 2002 (42.9). Such figures suggest that 
independent candidacy became less popular than 
party affiliation after the late 1980s and early 1990s. 
The drop in the number of independent candidates 
in 2002 is also intriguing in that it happened in 
the year when the total number of candidates was 
the highest ever for the country — 2,878, which 
was 507 more than 1997 and 118 more than 2007. 
More candidates were willing to run for political 
parties in 2002, the last first-past-the-post election. 
This was the electoral system that saw the effective 
use of ‘bogey’ or dummy candidates, covertly sup-
ported by candidates in the strongholds of their 
main rivals in the hope of luring votes away from 
their rivals. Such dummy candidates often ran as 
independents. Article 54 of the OLIPPAC prevents 
parties from multiple endorsements of candidates 
in a single electorate. It may be that many of the 
candidates who would have contested under parties 
in the past saw a need to register their own political 
parties, and that some candidates who contested as 
independents were actually aligned with a party but 
could not reveal their association for fear of contra-
vening the OLIPPAC, or for other reasons.5
However, to concentrate solely on the number 
of independent candidates misses the complete 
picture. There is essentially a converse relationship 
between the number of registered parties and the 
number of independent candidates. Table 3 (row 5) 
shows that the number of registered parties in 2002 
(the year when independent candidacy dropped by 
27.1 per cent) more than doubled the 1997 figure. 
What then are plausible reasons for this inverse 
relationship? Perhaps the most credible factor is 
that funding is earmarked for registered political 
parties under Article 75 of the OLIPPAC. Contest-
ing elections in more recent times has become an 
expensive exercise for many candidates and politi-
cal parties (see AusAID Review Team 2003:22–23). 
Another reason could be that many candidates 
were not sure what their status would be under the 
OLIPPAC as independent candidates. The law was 
introduced with much fanfare and it generated a lot 
of discussion as well as confusion. To be on the safe 
side, it was best for candidates to avoid independent 
candidacy and either join existing political parties 
or register under newly created parties.
Another aspect of independent candidacy has  
to do with the reduction in the number of inde-
pendent MPs in parliament as they decide to join  
political parties. Referring to the 2002–2007 
parliamentary term, Reilly (2006:191) cites the 17 
independents who had won seats in 2002 and were 
subsequently reduced in number to two by 2005 
as the other 15 joined political parties. This is a 
picture consistent with the trend after the 2007  
national election. Twenty-one successful indepen-
dent candidates entered parliament in August 2007. 
This figure had dropped to nine in November 2010  
(Office of the Registrar of Political Parties and 
Candidates 10 November 2010).6 Two points need 
to be made regarding such a trend. First, a few MPs  
remain independent because they choose not to be  
swayed by the attractions that come with ministries 
or government assignments. National Capital 
District Governor Powes Parkop stated after his 
2007 election victory that a decision to join a 
political party would depend on the quality of a 
party’s leadership (The National 31 July 2007). He is 
one of nine independent MPs as of November 2010. 
Secondly, lest one credits the OLIPPAC for it, it has  
long been common for successful independent 
candidates to join political parties after they enter 
parliament; independent candidacy was often used  
as a strategy to allow successful independents maxi-
mum mobility at the start of each parliamentary 
term. Table 4 illustrates the situation immediately 
before and after the 1982 election. The first row 
shows how party membership stood during the 
final parliamentary sitting before the election. 
Pangu Pati had 33 members, but was the major 
party in the Opposition. The People’s Progress Party 
led the coalition government up to the election 
with only 20 members. The independent members 
totalled eight, a considerably lower number than the 
13 members who had entered parliament after the 
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1977 national election (see Hegarty 1983:11). After 
the June election, Pangu Pati emerged as the major 
party with 50 members. The Melanesian Alliance, 
with only eight members, posed the major chall-
enge to Pangu for government leadership at this 
time. The Melanesian Alliance had the backing of 
the People’s Progress Party and the National Party.
Pangu and the Melanesian Alliance could eas-
ily have formed a majority of 58, based on the June 
numbers. However, this did not happen because 
there was a personality clash between the party 
leaders and fears of doublecrossing. Thus, the 
Pangu Pati took on additional members from the 
independents and MPs who switched from other 
parties. By August the Pangu-led bloc claimed a 
total of 61 members. By then there were no inde-
pendent members left, and the People’s Progress 
Party, Melanesian Alliance and United Party had 
lost one, two and three members from their respec-
tive ranks. This ensured that the Pangu Pati leader, 
Michael Somare, became prime minister again after 
an unsuccessful challenge from John Momis of the 
Melanesian Alliance (who is currently the president 
of the Autonomous Bougainville Government).
Vote of No Confidence
Votes of no confidence, in theory, constitute 
the ‘safety valve’ that releases political pressure 
during crises in lieu of other practices that may 
compromise the spirit and practice of parliamentary 
democracy and the ethos of good governance. 
Theory, however, does not always correspond to 
reality. As noted, Papua New Guinea governments 
have often been affected by threats of no confidence 
motions as well as actual votes. A grace period exists 
during which an incumbent government’s leadership 
cannot be challenged. Initially after independence, 
the grace period was six months after an election; 
this was extended in 1991 to 18 months. Prime 
Minister Somare tried unsuccessfully to push for a 
	
Source
Total number  
of candidates
1,513 1,655 2,371 2,878 2,760 1987, 1992, 1997, 2002: Baker (2005:109);  
2007: May (2008:2).
Total number  
of independents
959 1,226 1,660 1,235 1,284 1987: Oliver (1989:2); 1992: Saffu (1996:30); 
1997: May (2006); 2002: PNG Electoral 
Commission (29 July 2002); 2007: May (2008:4).
Independents 
as percentage of 
candidates (%)
63.4 74.1 70.0 42.9 46.5 1987, 1992, 1997: Baker (2005:109); 2002: PNG 
Electoral Commission (29 July 2002); 2007: 
May (2008:2).
Number of 
seats won by 
independents
22 39 36 17* 21 1987, 1992: Saffu (1996:30); 1997: Kaiulo 
(1997:14); 2002: PNG Electoral Commission 
(29 July 2002); 2007: May (2008:4).  
See also table note.
Number of 
registered 
political parties
14 19 20 43 34 1987: Oliver (1989: Appendix 3); 1992: Saffu 
(1996:30); 1997: May (2002:8); 2002: PNG 
Electoral Commission (28 April 2005);  
2007: May (2008:5).
Election year
1987        1992        1997         2002          2007
 * Six Southern Highlands’ electorates were declared void during the polling period in 2002  
due to election-related unrest. Therefore the 2002 figure in row 4 excludes these seats.
Table 3: Independent Candidates, 1987–2007
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further extension to 36 months after his coalition 
got into power in 2002 (see Gelu 2005:90).
There have been cases where an actual or 
threatened vote of no confidence was instrumental 
in changing governments and therefore averting 
potentially serious situations, as was the case when 
Bill Skate resigned from the prime ministership in 
1999 rather than face certain defeat on the floor of 
parliament the following day.
All things considered, a way had to be found 
to minimise the use and abuse of the vote of 
no confidence after the grace periods. The 
OLIPPAC in that regard was designed to 
‘fight fire with fire’.
The adoption of the OLIPPAC in 2001 
generated discussion of how best to address the 
issue of no confidence motions, but the vote of 
no confidence appeared to be secondary to the 
higher goal of parliamentary stability, and the 
issue was not resolved. Part I(1) of the OLIPPAC 
referred to the vote of no confidence in spelling 
out the grounds for compliance of the law with 
Section 38 of the national Constitution (General 
Qualifications of Qualified Rights), and there were 
references to the vote of no confidence under 
Sections 65–73 of the OLIPPAC, which covered the 
grounds for MPs voting and abstaining. However, 
the concern here was to prescribe MPs’ behaviour 
so as to avoid instability. It was left to MPs to 
devise how they would behave within the confines 
of the OLIPPAC. The vote of no confidence was 
thus ‘collateral damage’ in pursuit of the desired 
outcome, which was parliamentary stability.
In hindsight, it would have been better for 
the OLIPPAC not to restrict the use of the vote 
of no confidence, in spite of it having been used 
previously in unscrupulous ways. It was better to 
have regular changes of government for whatever 
reasons than to face the prospect of having 
unpopular governments in power for extended 
periods of time. The fact that Sir Julius Chan, a 
two-time prime minister and current Governor 
of New Ireland Province, used a popular public 
forum (the Waigani Seminar) in 2008 to brand 
Somare a legal ‘dictator’ indicated the unpopularity 
of the government and made a dramatic comment 
on the state of democracy in Papua New Guinea 
(The National 15 August 2008).7 A better option 
would have been to consider alternative approaches 
to the vote of no confidence outside the OLIPPAC.
Tyranny of the ‘Majority’
The search for greater parliamentary stability also 
ignored two trends that were very visible at the time 
the OLIPPAC was drafted: the heavy dominance 
of the executive arm over the legislature, and the 
ever-increasing intrusion of money politics. These 
trends were not unique to Papua New Guinea, but 
they were sufficient to frustrate the objectives of 
the OLIPPAC. A UNDP study conducted in 2003, 
partly under the auspices of the Papua New Guinea 
parliamentary Speaker’s office, identified a number 
of areas of parliament that required urgent reform 
so that parliamentary business could be conducted 
with purpose and vibrancy (Okole et al. 2003). One 
of the areas identified was the predicament of a 
weakened opposition and the need to improve the 
oversight role of the legislature. Parliament at that 
time was considered a rubber stamp, used to usher 
in policies and directives initiated at the whim of 
the government of the day. The only female MP in 
the national parliament, Lady Carol Kidu, described 
the situation at the time of the UNDP study as one 
of ‘parliamentary democracy with NEC dictator-
ship’ (Okole et al. 2003:21). The OLIPPAC, under 
Section 64, provides for election of the Opposition 
Leader and for an office of the Opposition which 
shall have access to annual funding from the  
Consolidated Revenue Fund.
There have been 109 seats in the unicameral 
parliament since the first post-independence election 
took place in 1977. The national popula-tion has 
doubled since then, from about three million to 
over six million, and the demands placed on elected 
representatives have increased. The election of the 
Speaker is the first item on the agenda for the new 
parliament and whoever secures the support of at 
least 55 members (a simple majority) out of the 
remaining 108 MPs gets to control government. 
Buoyed by numerical support, the government can 
render ineffective the Opposition and the oversight 
role of the legislature in general. This was already the 
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case during the drafting of the OLIPPAC (see Okole 
2002:39).8 Rather than having the prime minister 
seek and renew his leadership mandate on the floor 
of parliament, the OLIPPAC virtually accorded 
him a five-year lease of the post. The situation is 
further convoluted if the Speaker of Parliament 
fails to maintain impartiality, especially if he is 
supported by the government. The key oversight 
role of the legislature is then likely to be further 
undermined because the Opposition — which could 
just be the voice of reason — is susceptible to being 
continuously overruled.
Money Politics
Financial inducement, for the personal use of 
MPs or for projects in constituencies, was rife in 
Papua New Guinea well before the OLIPPAC. The 
position of prime minister was not spared the 
encroachment of money politics; a vote for the 
prime minister was seen to have a price tag on it. 
As noted above, the Skate government was believed 
to have been created by money in 1997. Other 
government changes in the late 1980s and 1990s 
involved exchanges in huge amounts of money, 
and governments have been sustained by money. 
An exasperated Sir Julius Chan once stated that, as 
prime minister,
[I am wasting time in] coping with requests 
for special favours of all kinds, financial 
and otherwise, from individual politicians. I 
will be even franker and say that if a Prime 
Minister is determined to stay in office he 
can do so quite easily if he is prepared to 
grant enough favours … I can’t speak for 
my predecessor, Michael Somare, but I 
would be most surprised if he didn’t face the 
same problems and I cannot see how any 
alternative head of government could avoid 
them (quoted in Kavanamur 2006).
If money politics predated the OLIPPAC, there 
was a danger that restrictions on the movement of 
MPs could further entrench debilitating problems 
of corruption, nepotism and general maladminis-
tration of public institutions. Before the Supreme 
Court ruling of 2010 the OLIPPAC rendered the 
government almost immune to close scrutiny of its 
behaviour on the floor of parliament. Those who 
dared to oppose decisions taken within government 
were dealt with harshly. Explaining his dismissal 
from the Somare government in 2006, former 
Treasury Minister Bart Philemon lamented that 
his removal was due to his refusal to implement a 
Somare order to issue $200 million worth of bonds 
and release the ‘slush funds’ given to government 
MPs that were needed to build support ahead of the 
July 2007 general elections (Chin 2007:201). A simi-
lar situation occurred in 2010 when the secretary 
of the Department of Planning and Monitoring was 
suspended then claimed to have been ordered by 
the government to release PGK112 million to coali-
tion members ‘to honour certain government com-
mitments’ and in the process ward off an expected 
no confidence motion against Somare in November 
2010 (Post-Courier 7 February 2011).
What is alarming about such payments is not 
just that public funds are flagrantly used for purely 
political reasons, but that the much-desired consoli-
dation of political parties and continuity of govern-
ments is now subjected to monetary transactions.
The success of the National Alliance during 
the 2007 election — with 27 members elected — 
was remarkable. The next most successful political 
party (the People’s Action Party) won only six seats. 
This may be compared with the National Alliance’s 
success in 2002 when the party won 19 seats and 
the next most successful party, People’s Democratic 
Movement, won 12 (AusAID Review Team 2003:9). 
With its membership increased to 39 members 
in November 2010 (even though some National 
Alliance MPs such as Puka Temu left the party), the 
National Alliance dominated parliament with 36 per 
cent of seats, including that of the Speaker.
Certainly, there is nothing illegal about wide 
disparities in party strengths, but what may offer  
grounds for concern to proponents of good 
governance is that implementation of the OLIPPAC 
has progressively facilitated the dominance of the 
executive arm by one political party. The process 
leading to dominance starts with Section 63 of 
the OLIPPAC, which invites the party that wins 
the highest number of seats in an election to form 
government. Subsequently, wheeling and dealing 
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comes into play and independent MPs and small 
parties are lured into joining the government by 
promises of cash, projects and similar benefits. 
Some resemblance of ‘stability’ is thus achieved in 
parliament, but it is not the type of stability that is 
sustainable over the long term.
By extension, there is a worrying scenario 
when one or two political parties become too 
dominant. What will become of the smaller parties 
if the bigger parties and their coalition partners 
use state resources to buy their way through the 
next elections? It would not be the first time that 
state institutions have been used and resources 
pillaged in this manner. The National Alliance was 
re-elected in this way in 2007, creating a precedent. 
Only if the other parties have the capacity and 
see the need to band together to minimise the 
influence of the largest party can this be countered.
Concluding Remarks
This paper has attempted a critical review of the 
OLIPPAC from its adoption in 2001 until the 
Supreme Court ruling in mid-2010 which rendered 
null and void certain sections of the OLIPPAC as 
being inconsistent with the national Constitution. 
What the national government does with the 
remaining sections of the law is yet to be seen.  
It is worth salvaging what is left of the organic law 
to ensure a way forward to strengthen political 
parties and facilitate parliamentary stability. The 
creation of the Integrity of Political Parties and 
Candidates Commission is one positive provision 
since it serves as the main interlocutor between 
parties and other relevant government agencies  
and a facilitator of party building and strengthen-
ing activities. It is also the most appropriate office 
to liaise with donor agencies and institutions that 
want to assist in processes of strengthening the 
country’s party system.
While much of this paper has been about 
the outcome of the OLIPPAC, there is a serious 
broader issue that needs to be considered. Much 
of the concern relating to poor governance and 
administrative problems in Papua New Guinea, 
just as in any country in the world, is about 
behavioural issues. Behaviour in this regard may 
reflect standards and pressures that derive from 
innate characteristics of culture. Thus, ‘there may 
be a tendency in PNG to place too much emphasis 
on changes to political institutions when what 
lies at the heart of the problem are behavioural 
issues or issues of political culture’ (Morgan 
et al. 2005:11). It is important to acknowledge 
this reality because no amount of legislation or 
regulation will be sufficient to address problems 
when the very people who are expected to abide by 
the remedial steps are bent on undermining them. 
Sepoe (2005:6) had this in mind when she said that 
the ‘OLIPPAC is as good as the users who abide 
by it and are serious about political stability and 
the common good’. The same can be said about 
some of the problems relating to elections in Papua 
New Guinea, especially in terms of vote-rigging, 
violence and threats against candidates and voters, 
and bribery. The Papua New Guinea Electoral 
Commission and police can only go so far in 
terms of taking preventive measures. The goals 
of strengthening political parties and stabilising 
parliamentary politics are not dependent alone on 
laws such as the OLIPPAC. Their achievement also 
hinges on public behaviour and whether effective 
remedial steps are implemented and adhered to by 
those who are subjected to them.
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Endnotes
1 These debates on the success and failure of the 
OLIPPAC are best understood in the context of 
how the law was viewed during the early years of 
its implementation. The supposed failure of the law 
stemmed mainly from the continuity of political 
activities that were supposed to have been outlawed. 
The claims of success were more in line with some of 
the early indications that qualified a break from the 
past. The clearest example was how the OLIPPAC 
ensured that the most successful party after the 2002 
national elections was given the mandate to form 
a coalition government. As this paper will show, 
however, some of the claims of success came out of 
misreading the situation on the ground.
2 Since the time of writing, two new provinces have 
been created: Hela and Jiwaka in the Highlands 
Region.  Both provinces will be taking part in the 
2012 national elections.
3 For an analysis of the Supreme Court ruling, see 
Wolfers (2010).
4 Michael Somare did serve a full term between 1972 
and 1977, as chief minister until independence in 
1975 and then as prime minister until the national 
elections in 1977. In 1972 Somare formed a coalition 
government which in effect was the first-ever 
indigenous government. This was part of the ongoing 
handing-over of state and public institutions in 
preparation for eventual independence.
5 It is widely rumoured that Patrick Tammur, the 
current member for Kokopo, contested this electorate 
in 2007 as a candidate for the National Alliance but 
was portrayed in the ballot paper as an independent 
candidate. The incumbent member for the electorate 
leading into the elections was the highly revered 
former prime minister, Sir Rabbie Namaliu, a five-
term MP (1982–2007), leader of the Pangu Pati 
and a senior cabinet minister in Somare’s coalition 
government. To avoid the unwanted situation of 
the National Alliance being seen as a traitor by Sir 
Rabbie’s many supporters, it was best that Tammur 
contested as an independent candidate.
6 Ideally, the best data to use should be from around 
May or June 2010, just before the July Supreme Court 
judgement.
7 Sir Julius Chan went as far as likening Somare to 
Zimbabwe’s President Robert Mugabe, which in a 
Papua New Guinea perspective epitomises a third-
world dictator in this day and age.
8 An important caveat concerns how independents 
were expected to vote under the OLIPPAC: 
independents had the options of voting with the 
prime minister or abstaining (see Sections 70–73 
of the OLIPPAC), in contrast with MPs from 
parties who were expected to vote in line with party 
resolutions or positions. How the independents voted, 
whether to support or abstain, could have made a 
difference in terms of the numerical support (or lack 
thereof) on important issues — the numerical support 
accorded to a prime minister when he was initially 
voted in as prime minister is not guaranteed for all 
voting situations.
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